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Introduction 
The ongoing ‘euro crisis’ is often seen as an economic issue and referred to as the 
European sovereign debt crisis. Admittedly, a comprehensive economic analysis demonstrates 
that the euro crisis has several origins and is not just a simple debt crisis (Lane, 2012). There 
are multiple root causes and vulnerabilities, particularly the flawed European economic and 
fiscal governance (Herzog, 2013). However, as I establish in this paper, the euro crisis has a 
firm sociological underpinning at the same time. According to Luhmann’s ‘Social Systems 
Theory’, there is a fundamental problem in functional systems, such as in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). In other words, Europe is facing a social-systems problem rather 
than just an economic crisis. This insight is intuitive under the recognition that the euro crisis 
is not merely a macroeconomic and monetary issue, and thus, as I will show, relates also to 
flawed functional systems as studied in sociology. 
The fundamental dynamics of states, institutions, and humans is predisposed to both 
group interactions and incentives. Sociological theory studies those group patterns and 
behaviours and thus do have an impact to resolve the euro crisis in the real world. Economic 
theory on the other hand lacks a rigorous discussion of group interactions because this is too 
sophisticated to be subsumed under the assumption of the methodological individualism à la 
Max Weber (1929). 
I find that Luhmann’s approach precisely reveals this insight, especially in respect to 
the systemic effects of the macro-economy. The constructivist idea demonstrates – the 
repeatedly unconnected – linkages between the institutional (legal), economic, and political 
system. Thus, this interdisciplinary study of the economic and sociological origins of the 
European sovereign debt crisis appears promising. Indeed any policy recommendation, which 
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tackles the existing flaws in fiscal and economic governance in Europe, requires a thorough 
understanding of both spheres. 
Section 2 starts with the economic analysis of the root causes and implications. In 
section 3, I utilize Luhmann’s social systems theory to obtain a new perspective on the euro 
crisis. Finally, I compare insights and implications of both scientific perspectives, and 
summarize the policy recommendations in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
1. Economic Perspective
To make this paper comprehensible to an interdisciplinary community, I shall briefly 
explain the necessary economic theory and mainstream arguments about the root causes of the 
euro crisis in this section. There are already excellent overview articles on the economic root 
causes by Lane (2012), Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012), Sachverständigenrat (2012), De 
Grauwe and Ji (2013) and Geithner (2014). 
There is no doubt that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been in an 
economic and political crisis since 2010. The first fundamental problem is the current account 
imbalance across the macro-economy of the euro area member states (Herzog, 2012). 
Secondly the European institutional structure is unsuitable to tackle this issue. There is 
a consensus that fiscal and economic governance is a prerequisite for a successful and 
effective monetary union (Escolano et al., 2012) and this has been identified in economic 
literature long ago (Beetsma and Bovernberg, 1999; Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). However, the 
European integration process follows path dependence, and thus fails to resolve both sudden 
and long-run economic challenges. Consequently, the current contagious economic issues put 
the EMU at risk. 
The third problem lies in the fact that a monetary union must entail rules that are 
driven by market forces. This is because only market forces are sufficiently effective to 
enhance the competitiveness of European governance and economies. Unfortunately, 
policymakers have switched off almost all existing market forces in the euro area, and they 
failed in building sufficient institutions (rules) that imitate the forces of markets. But this is 
essential in a supranational monetary union due to additional conflicts such as moral hazard 
and limited effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy. Provided that policymakers are both 
unable and unwilling to establish either a political union or sufficient market forces in the 
near future, the EMU is doomed to fail. This demonstrates that the EMU is at a crossroads 
(Herzog, 2013). 
1.1. Economic Explanation of the Euro Crisis 
Herzog and Hengestermann (2013) demonstrate that the flawed macroeconomic 
structures and incentives are root causes of the euro crisis. In order to explain these issues, I 
shall distinguish between a macroeconomic and an institutional economic approach. 
From the institutional point of view, the EMU lacks an effective enforcement of the 
rules. Many rules have the one-size-fits-all problem and hence too many loopholes. Some 
rules are also unmeasurable or have the problem of inconclusiveness, as criteria point in 
opposite directions. Since the onset of EMU in 1999 and the subsequent coordination 
procedures, such as the Lisbon Strategy in 2002, the European Union has endorsed several 
processes to mitigate the existing malfunctions in economic and fiscal governance. However, 
concrete progress was always blocked by national reservations of member states. For 
example, southern euro area member states attained attractive credit conditions provided by 
negative real interest rates due to the membership in the EMU. However, they were both 
unwilling to pay back or use this subsidy to build up cushions for economically bad times. 
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Thus, public and private borrowing was too cheap and hence in vogue among these countries. 
In the end, this eroded the competitiveness and contributed to the current account imbalances 
of the Eurozone (Herzog, 2012). This is still the main macroeconomic problem of today. 
Another force behind the divergence of competitiveness is more apparent: the flawed 
macroeconomic incentives. For instance, in Ireland and Spain, public debt was rather low 
before the crisis. The problem in Spain and Ireland was the excessive private borrowing 
especially in the housing market. The flawed macroeconomic incentives in the euro area, 
created by negative real interest rates, led to the build-up of an asset/housing bubble in both 
countries. Therefore, it can be concluded that the sovereign debt crisis is not only the 
consequence of insolvent banks, high public debts, or the burst of a bubble; but rather reflects 
flawed design of rules and political ignorance to enforce the existing ones. 
In addition to this problem, there is a substantial divergence in unit-labour costs, i.e. 
wages in south-European states grew faster than productivity, meaning that their unit-labour 
costs – relative to their major rivals – were around 20 per cent higher than those in 2000 
(Herzog, 2012). This development improved the competitiveness of the core European states, 
such as Germany, and exacerbated the situation in the periphery (Table 1). Again this 
illustrates that economic governance has failed due to flawed incentives and the absence of 
essential market forces. 
Table 1. Level of productivity and labour costs 
Countries Annual average between 2000 and 2010 in per centProductivity Unit Labour Costs 
Germany 0.7 1.4 
Spain 1.1 3.7 
Greece 1.9 5.0 
Ireland 1.7 3.8 
Portugal 0.6 3.3 
Source: Herzog (2013) based on Eurostat data. 
However, the flawed incentives are even worse in the domain of public finances. 
Despite existing rules, such as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), public policy was unable 
to protect excessive debt accumulation, such as in Greece, Portugal, and Italy. The Stability 
and Growth Pact was implemented in 1997 to rule-out unsound fiscal policies and 
subsequently sovereign defaults. However, the SGP and related rules such as the no-bailout 
clause are neither credible nor enforceable. This is due to flawed political voting procedures 
and consequently the lack of enforcement of the existing rules. The existing rules to enhance 
sound public finances on a continuous level are vital in a supranational monetary union 
because of the greater free-riding and moral hazard dilemma (Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999; 
Hellwig, 2011). 
The experience of rule enforcement in the Eurozone for more than ten years reveals 
that the existing procedures do not internalise the costs and benefits of domestic policy. 
Indeed, it could be sometimes detrimental for countries to encourage the rule enforcement, if 
you could be the next violating the same rule. Naturally, the architect of the stability pact, the 
former German finance minister, Theo Waigel, argued in favour of an automatic enforcement. 
But there was no political agreement on this proposal in 1995. Consequently, the current 
European governance rewards cheating rather than compliance. In addition, the European 
institutions, including the EU-Commission, have limited willingness and no power to 
implement or enforce the rules at a national level.  
Bodo Herzog  ISSN 2071-789X 
RECENT ISSUES IN SOCIOLOGICAL  RESEARCH 
Economics & Sociology, Vol. 8, No 2, 2015 
105
For example, since five years there is a debate about the lag of reforms in Greece, 
under the current European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Indeed national policy-makers are 
frequently unwilling to act and the EU-Commission is unable to enforce. Henceforth, euro 
area member countries reject cooperation within the existing rules and get away with it. Of 
course, this is a renowned problem in the literature of public finance. Indeed, there are 
inherent incentives, on a state level, to overspend and delay reforms due to the electoral 
business cycle (Nordhaus, 1975; Alesina and Tabellini, 1987). Furthermore, these incentives 
are amplified in a monetary union due to free-riding and moral hazard (Beetsma and 
Bovernberg, 1999, 2000; Dixit and Lambertini, 2003). In addition, the stability pact 
overemphasises public deficits rather than both public and private debts. The reasons for this 
shortcoming are obvious political-economy arguments: a) a deficit is easier to observe and 
monitor and b) measuring sustainable debt levels require tough value judgements. 
Moreover, Herzog and Hengstermann (2013) demonstrate that the current governance 
is neither sufficient nor well designed for a long lasting monetary union. Therefore the 
challenge in the coming years is the redesign of European governance across independent and 
sovereign member states within a supranational context. The core principles of efficient 
governance are permanent incentives that resemble market forces and an independent or 
automatic enforcement of rules especially at supranational institutions.  
This insight is of critical importance in a further issue. Since the onset of the euro 
crisis economists identified the flawed financial market incentives as a further vulnerability in 
the euro area. The financial markets have not sufficiently differentiated the creditworthiness 
of euro area countries from 1999 to 2010. Though, since the beginning of the crisis in 2010, 
spreads of government bonds widened significantly. Remarkably, the surge in spreads is 
significantly larger than the change in the fundamentals (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). Although 
the existing supranational rules have the mission to unfold market forces, it is not surprising 
that they have not disciplined euro area member countries in normal times due to flawed 
fiscal and economic governance. Instead, markets overacted during turmoil due to faulty rules 
and incentives. The overreaction has also to do with animal spirits in financial markets 
(Herzog, 2013). The abrupt reversal during the euro crisis has produced a situation similar to 
a bank-run in the sovereign bond-markets. These self-reinforcing forces are highly contagious 
and thus a temporary liquidity problem evolves into enduring solvency crises. 
The rationale for the flawed incentives in the EMU becomes evident in the unique 
separation of domestic fiscal and supranational monetary policy. A stand-alone country, such 
as the UK or the US, has full control over their own currency, and thus can always guarantee 
the pay-out of bondholders. This guarantee does not exist in the EMU. Of course, the 
currency for all member countries is the Euro, and the European Central Bank (ECB) is 
responsible for price-stability according to article 105 TFEU1. However, the national euro-
debts cannot be paid back with the printing press of the ECB in case of emergency because 
the central bank will not act for demands of single euro area member countries. Consequently, 
supranational monetary policy eliminates the market forces in normal times, and leads to 
overreaction during turmoil. This literally unique interplay characterises the final root cause 
and vulnerability in the euro area. On the contrary, stand-alone countries, such as the UK or 
the US, continuously face market pressures and incentives in the run-up to a crisis, and have 
domestic policy instruments to tackle those problems immediately. 
1 TFEU = Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. 
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2. Sociological Perspective 
 
Social systems theory provides innovative insights to this economic crisis because it is 
an opposing approach to the mainstream economic setup in the previous section. Therefore, 
economists ought to study this perspective with an open mind. This approach does not 
describe reality as it is, but rather as what it has become. In addition, the social systems theory 
is beyond the assumption of the methodological individualism that is dominant in economics. 
 
2.1. Social Systems Theory à la Luhmann 
 
In order to make the paper comprehensible to an interdisciplinary group of scholars, I 
briefly explain the necessary components of Luhmann’s model. Of course, this subsection is 
not conclusive and contains only the crucial elements. 
The social systems theory describes society on the basis of events, and focuses on 
what actually happens or what it has become rather than its individual members. For instance, 
when one buys a car, this is understood as an economic event or, in the terminology of 
Luhmann, an ‘economic communication’ (Luhmann, 1976, 1995). The meaning of the word 
communication, however, is different from the day by day meaning. It is not just an individual 
thing even if you may see it as this in my simple example. In fact, communication has a very 
abstract interpretation in social systems theory and it is entirely different in any other system, 
e.g. politics, science, law, religion, etc. Thus, each social system and the communication 
within the system respectively are unique and singular. 
In general, Luhmann’s meaning of communication is not restricted to language, and 
even more importantly, agents do not and cannot communicate; only communication can. 
According to social systems theory, the traditional economic notion of an individual agent is a 
simplification of the actual sophistication of human existence. Put it in other words, 
economics studies the behaviour of agents within a superficial model, that is, according to 
Max Weber, the ‘homo oeconomicus’. However, from the point of view of sociological 
theory, frankly this is not new, Immanuel Kant (1787) already asserted that, a human being 
can never see the ‘true object’, rather the subjective appearance of the object. Thus, according 
to Kant, our two eyes cannot see most of what is out there. Even more importantly, everyone 
eyes see things differently with their own internal (brain) structure. In fact, to each human 
being, the world would look slightly different, and therefore each human being constructs the 
world oneself. The last insight is also true for the overall functional systems we study, 
including the economy. 
From a sociological point of view, an economic system is unique and singular, and 
thus the output of the system is a product of its own production. This idea was developed by 
Humberto Maturana (1981), and is called the concept of autopoiesis. Autopoiesis is 
‘something that produces something external to itself, namely a product (…) [or] …a system 
that is its own product’ (Luhmann, 2002, pp. 110-11). Consequently, in social systems theory 
the idea of input is replaced by the notion of self-construction. Therefore, there is no common 
world in reality according to Luhmann (1988). Instead, everyone constructs their own world. 
This is labelled as the constructivist view or network. Within this world, reality is not just an 
effort of individuals but rather a group autopoiesis. Henceforth every system produces itself 
and thereby its own reality. 
Let me introduce a further differentiation and special terminology. According to the 
social systems theory, function systems can be identified via system specific codes. The legal 
system operates on the basis of the legal/illegal code. The science system has the code of 
true/false, and the economic system operates under the code of payment/non-payment. Thus 
every system has another code and thus another medium to facilitate this code. For instance, 
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the medium for this code in the economic system is money. But what is the function of the 
medium money in the sociological model? Well, the function is as an economist would define 
analogously the elimination of trade-offs between unlimited wishes under scarce resources. In 
fact, the science of economics tries to solve this trade-off in the most efficient way. Table 2 
summarises the key terminology and structure of the social systems theory in respect to the 
economic, political, scientific, and media system. 
 
Table 2. Overview Luhmann’s Terminology 
 
System Function Code Medium 
Economy 
Mitigation of economic trade-offs, 
defined by unlimited wishes and 
scarce resources. 
Payment / Non-
payment Money 
Politics Setting up binding legal rules Government / Opposition Power 
Science Production of knowledge True / False Truth 
Media Production of news Info / Non-Info Communication 
 
Source: own. Modification of Moeller (2006), Luhmann Explained, p. 29. 
 
Back to my example: Why is money a special medium? Money, as the medium of the 
economic system, makes transactions much easier feasible. Otherwise, it would be almost 
impossible to match buyers and sellers in decentralised markets, as in the history of a barter 
economy. Furthermore money is more effective than goodwill or trust. Therefore, systems 
with rather unconventional mediums, such as faith, can hardly compete with the economic 
system. Even the medium of power in the political system or legislation in the judicial system 
is less effective and slower than the medium money in the economic system.  
Luhmann (1997, pp. 391-92) states that ‘The different capabilities for (…) 
communication media distinctively characterise the features of modern society. They lead to 
an unequal growth of the function systems. (…) a modern society rather increases the 
complexity of some systems (…).’ Henceforth over the long-run, Luhmann (1977) claims 
more and more functional differentiation across and within the economic system because it is 
more powerful and effective than other systems2. Functional differentiation within the 
economic system are typically organisations, however, this is a relatively new phenomenon 
that evolved along all different functional systems. Furthermore, the emergence of autopoiesis 
in the economic system facilitates the development of companies that build better 
relationships within countries and trading blocks, such as the European Union (EU). Thus 
social systems theory would label organisations as a facilitating ‘system of decision-making’. 
Noteworthy, only the members of organisations are part of the system of decision-making. 
This explains the fact, why organisations automatically include or exclude certain agents at 
the same time. The latter matter is called ‘operational closure’ in sociology. 
In order to explain this with the economic system, we study a simple economic 
transaction. Due to autopoiesis, we can only continue a first economic transaction with further 
economic transactions and with its medium (money), but never with other media, such as the 
medium of power in politics for instance. This is due to the operational closure of the 
functional system. The economy always functions economically, and politics always 
functions politically because both codes are different and closed, and neither can they control 
                                                 
2 This aspect is not considered enough in national and supranational politics in Europe and the World. In particular, in 
European politics, especially during the euro crisis, policy-makers have not recognized that the economic functional system 
and thus the Euro-currency (euro area) are already dictating the agenda to the political system and not the other way around. 
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nor communicate. You can witness this feature in Greece, in particular the ineffectiveness of 
the political rescue measures (communication) because the Greek economy faces mainly a 
structural economic challenge. But the best example to see this is the failure of the communist 
approach, in which politics attempted to steer the economy to the benefit of the society. Of 
course, the communist model has failed in economic history due to several reasons, however, 
there is no doubt that in communism the economy was continuously forced to communicate 
politically rather than economically. In the end, that does not work and has failed.  
Even the recent financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 demonstrates this point of operational 
closure. Obviously, the crisis can be analysed from two different perspectives, namely as a 
financial system (i.e. banks, rating agencies, financial products,…) or, on the one hand a legal 
system (regulations for leverage ratios, core capital ratios, regulatory arbitrage,…). Luhmann 
claims that operationally closed systems cannot be controlled by other functional systems, and 
the financial as well as legal system cannot control each other respectively. From a 
sociological point of view, this insight might be a trivial understanding as to why capitalism 
has failed in the recent financial crisis. In other words, each system is controlled solely by 
itself. But this does not mean that closed systems do not influence each other. Politics 
certainly influences the economy and vice versa. 
The idea of influence across functional systems is referred to as ‘structural coupling’. 
Put simply, it is defined as a mechanism in which different functional systems continuously 
resonate or interact with each other. For example, a new tax enforced by the political system 
interacts and resonates within the economic system in form of higher sales prices and the 
concomitant behavioural consequences. In the end, this affects supply and demand and 
eventually the medium (money). In the next subsection, I utilise the ideas of the social 
systems theory in order to study and analyse the euro crisis from a sociological point of view. 
 
2.2. Sociological Explanation of the Euro Crisis 
 
First I study the external origins of the euro crisis. On the one hand the 
macroeconomic imbalances which are driven by trade globalisation and on the other hand the 
spill-overs from the US-subprime crisis from 2007 to 2009 to the European sovereign debt 
crisis. Obviously citizens often use the abstract threat of globalization as an explanation for 
severe crises, and also for the euro area troubles. Economically, however, as discussed 
previously, these are not the only root causes. 
The characteristic of functional differentiation implies that countries and societies are 
no longer divided by regional borders. The term ‘globalisation’ points out the fact that 
function systems, especially the economic system, go beyond the geographical and cultural 
borders. Other subsystems, such as science and politics, spread over the globe as well: for 
example, the development of G6, G8, and G20 in politics and a similar cooperation dynamic 
exist in higher education. Consequently territorial boundaries have less meaning today than in 
the past. Thus, it no longer makes sense to speak of economies or politics in plural from this 
point of view.  
But there is an evident problem within the globalisation and European integration 
dynamics: political authority and sovereignty – even in the highly integrated euro area – are 
limited within their borders. In fact, this issue has mainly contributed to the US-subprime 
crisis and the euro crisis. As previously mentioned in the economic discussion, the euro area 
member states cannot guarantee that their bondholders will be paid back, because they are 
subject to a supranational monetary policy. Hence, the euro area is unlike stand-alone 
countries with one currency, with one central bank and easy to use national policies. Another 
example of this problem is ‘regulatory arbitrage’. In this case, financial institutions cleverly 
bypass strict local regulations with lax international regulations. Therefore, I firstly conclude 
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that economic communication is global communication, whereas binding political 
communication is still (all over the globe) local communication. This mismatch is well-
known, however, not tackled in politics over the past nor will it be in the near future. Even in 
the past decade in the euro area – per definition a monetary union of highly integrated 
countries – you can observe how almost all political reforms conserve the national 
sovereignty instead of adapting it to a European or global communication system, especially 
in the fields of finance or public policy (Herzog, 2013). 
But this does not imply that there are no similarities in the global economic system. 
On the contrary, poor regions operate in the same system as rich regions. The same applies 
within the euro area itself. Cheap labour in Portugal and the overall low price level in 
Germany constitute one system. Therefore, social homogeneity, trade relationships and the 
currency union are not fair in its essence. The economic dynamics generates functional 
equality (‘structural coupling’) and inequality (‘operational closure’) at the same time, 
because states with structural differences are governed under the same code.  
This sociological insight explains also a variety of recent regional separatist 
movements within the European Union, e.g. the Scotland vote, the United Kingdom and 
Catalonia wish of secession, and the suggestion of an exit of the Greek economy a so-called 
‘Grexit’. The regional resistance is derived from the functional differentiation in Europe and 
the distinctive regional, religious, and cultural identities. Hence, the survival of the Greek, 
Portuguese or German society can be understood as a ‘process of insulation’ according to 
Luhmann (1997, p. 796). The separatist motion attempts to build perceived certainty even if it 
is incongruent with the functional systems and their codes. Consequently, the separatist 
movements are neither sustainable nor effective in a European Union and in a globalised 
market in general. 
With this in mind, it is important to recognize that the economic function systems of 
the euro area, is all-inclusive and exclusive at the same time. It sounds like an economic 
paradox, however, it is exemplified to be true from the insight of social systems theory. For 
example, a lack of money easily leads to the exclusion from other (sub-)systems even within 
an all-inclusive economic and monetary union. The case of the Greek economy inside the 
euro area is the best example of today. The fast dynamics of further functional differentiation 
within the EMU has produced in particular economic and social exclusion. This type of 
inequalities cannot be properly analysed or explained within the state-of-the-art science of 
economics. Unfortunately, neither persons nor politics can easily steer a society of autopoietic 
function systems – only systems themselves can. With this in mind you immediately see the 
widespread limits of the European parliament, the EU-Commission, the European Council 
and the Troika in general. Only if we impose the, almost switched-off, market forces in the 
euro area again, we would get a chance to stabilize the EMU. 
The existence of austerity to tackle the euro crisis affects first of all the overall 
political communication and perhaps finally results in changes in the economy. According to 
Luhmann (1998), there is no direct relation between political austerity in the economic system 
and its social and political effects, such as mass unemployment or a voting out. These effects 
are socially constructed and there will be no direct feedback on the economy in return. 
Consequently, there is no operational causality between society and its economy. However, 
national policy-makers always blame Europe for the bad things in their own country and thus 
ease the public impression that these things are closely connected. In fact, this behaviour is 
observable in particular in euro area countries under the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) that provides emergency liquidity to states under certain conditionality’s. 
Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to compute the economic resonance of irritations 
from the other systems. The sociological theory, however, does not claim that all political or 
economic communications are useless and should be disposed. It only argues that a political 
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initiative – such as austerity towards sound public finances – has first and foremost effects on 
politics, and not on the economy. We simple hope that the policy creates a spill-over and 
results in resonance within the economic system boundaries. Consequently, the political 
impulse towards austerity in the EMU is rather a political success than an economic. It is 
doubtful – as Greece demonstrates – that public finances would result in any difference 
without the political pressure from countries such as Netherlands, Finland or Germany. But 
for sure politics and public finances in the donor countries would be affected. In summary, a 
society can react to domestic economic problems only with domestic economic 
communication, i.e. domestic structural reforms. Communications, i.e. possible solution 
mechanisms, cannot exist across the functional systems, e.g. supranational politics cannot 
solve domestic economic problems and political austerity cannot solve economically 
uncompetitive and indebted countries in general. 
The main concern with purely political reform motions, such as austerity in public 
finances, is in its arrogance because it lacks the solution of the economic root causes, but 
claims to know exactly what is wrong and what should be done. The problem with this 
approach is that it creates a lot of social iteration without being able to directly connect this 
communication with the issues that must be addressed soon. Hence supranational political 
initiatives – such as the Troika – and like any other kind of crisis activism, e.g. new rescue 
facilities such as the ESM, produce both too little and too much resonance at the same time. 
This political communication is hardly able to effectively change the (home) economy and its 
uncompetitive structures. 
The problem of too little and too much resonance is a typical characteristic of crisis 
response or activism in general. It attempts to address ‘trans-communicational’ issues, but it 
functions merely within its own structure. Again the latter is due to the functional 
differentiation within modern economies. European rescue facilities or austerity measures do 
not lead per se to a more stable economy within and across euro area member states. Thus, 
according to social systems theory, there is no empirical or theoretical reason to believe that 
this rescue approach is likely to be effective, even if it is carefully considered and designed by 
economists. 
Once the information is released (and constructed) that the Greek economy is 
indebted, the questions is: how much, and then followed by why, and who is holding the debt. 
This illustrates a vicious cycle of information in the media system which communicates to the 
economic system. All existing information must be replaced by new information; again 
autopoiesis. The system is continuously feeding its own output, with knowledge of certain 
facts, back into the system. Once something is known to be known, more knowledge is asked 
for, or the opposite of it. The code of information/non-information, payment/non-payment, or 
government/opposition needs concrete fields, such as the indebtness of an economy. Even the 
word “bailout” is a misnomer and requires specification. ‘Creditor bailout’ would be more 
appropriate because they are about the only group that would be harmed once an economic 
‘run’ has started. Unfortunately, by bailing out Greek creditors today, this would imply that 
Italian, Portuguese, Spanish creditors are bailout as well (or it is at least less likely that they 
will fail) because these countries are economically and financially bigger and thus even more 
systemic to the overall euro area. Hence, almost all other euro area member countries are 
considered as domino-like contagious. 
Undoubtedly there is a structural coupling of the economic system with the political, 
media, and judicial system in Europe. Interestingly, there is a kind of dominance of the 
economic and media system in Europe of today. The primacy of the political system, which 
has its legitimation by democratic elections, seems to become increasingly weaker in the 
EMU. Both the economy and the media system pressures the policymakers to act without any 
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legitimation and, even more importantly, across the functional system boundaries. But, in 
consequence, this is rather ineffective. 
The interdependence of national public debt-brakes and the European Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) is a good example. These two debt-rules illustrate what happens to social 
systems under structural coupling. They cannot do without each other. They inevitably irritate 
one another in a constant manner. However, both interdependent and autonomous issues have 
their autopoiesis. The national debt-brake (and the political behaviour respectively) does not 
change the SGP any more than the SGP change the national debt-brake. Both the political 
concept of change or, in sociological theory, manipulation is much too simple to explain the 
institutional complexity in the euro area. But social systems theory enlightens the fact that 
wanting to see everything “as it is” will result in seeing nothing. Even the institutional 
economic approach that studies any detail and the overall incentive structure is constraint for 
its own sack. Therefore the economic reality, which is to be identified, is of course not the 
entire reality. This is an old and unambiguous insight by Immanuel Kant again. Reality is 
neither one-dimensional nor subject to consensus. It is probably more of a dynamic and 
stochastic process defined by diversity and self-constructed meaning at the same time. 
 
3. A New Paradigm for the Euro Area 
 
The policymakers responded to the euro crisis mainly with new rescue facilities, such 
as the European Stability Mechanism or a further reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Indeed these measures stopped the sudden turmoil and severe economic consequences in euro 
area and finally mitigated the likelihood of sovereign defaults. Even the European Central 
Bank (ECB) followed a similar policy response. The ECB president Mario Draghi announced 
in a famous London-speech in 2012 that ‘ECB is ready to do whatever it takes. And believe 
me, it will be enough.’ This message significantly lowered the default probability, too. And 
for the long-run, policymakers designed austerity and growth initiatives in attempt to mitigate 
a future crisis. 
However, searching for an overall and sustainable solution for the euro crisis requires 
a far more accurate diagnosis. Regrettably all politically designed rescue facilities and 
monetary policy measures give rise to moral hazard. Instantaneously after the introduction of 
the new rules, countries game their way around. Economically we already see that euro area 
member states currently play with the rescue facilities. This observation demonstrates already 
today a source of future crises. Although austerity measures, debt rules, and the fiscal 
compact seem to be a logical necessity, it basically follows the philosophy of self-enforcing 
systems, path dependency, or autopoiesis in sociological terminology. But the existing 
systems (i.e. the EMU) cannot be cleaned up, reformed, or made more rule-based easily – that 
will not work for the reason of sociological constraints identified above. Even if most of the 
‘new’ rules and regulations serve good purpose. 
The current crisis instruments – even they intend it – no longer enforce sustainable 
public finances ex ante because the enhanced backing of the overall system entails greater 
moral hazard. Furthermore, some crisis mechanisms even amplify moral hazard in the euro 
area. Actually, the incentives for sovereign bond investors to monitor the quality of public 
debts or care about excessive public and private deficit levels has weakened massively due to 
the new rescue facilities. Therefore, euro area policymakers accompanied all rescue facilities 
with conditionality’s in attempt to offset moral hazard. However, the unintended 
consequences of both the old and newly designed and discretionary rules led into the mess of 
today. Admittedly, the consequences of the new rules despite conditionality’s probably make 
the euro area even more vulnerable and fragile. Hence, the whole euro area is becoming even 
more dependent on further political and legal interventions. Correspondingly, we can 
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scientifically observe that the array of firefighting tools invites people to hold fewer fire 
extinguishers and finally makes a huge fire more likely and not less. 
The economic and sociological study of the root causes of the EMU crisis demonstrate 
that rescue measures, regulations and current institutions are poor substitutes for continuous 
market discipline in different functional systems, such as prevalent in stand-alone countries. 
Market forces cannot be substituted just by institutions. On the contrary, some of the new 
European rules and rescue mechanisms even undermine the market forces. Moreover, the 
European rules and rescue measures are too complex and overlapping. Even the supranational 
guarding of the rules, the EU-Commission, is unable or unwilling to protect its own rules, as 
the following observation demonstrates: In 2014, the EU-Commission proposed further 
flexibility within the SGP ‘…while making the best possible use of the flexibility that is built 
into the existing rules of the Pact, as reformed in 2005 and 2011.’ (EU-Commission, 2014). 
But at the same time, the EU-Commission finds that ‘… seven countries [out of 16] run a risk 
of non-compliance with the SGP’3. This indicates how contradictory and schizophrenic the 
EU-Commission has become, an institution that has the responsibility to protect the existing 
rules of the EMU according to the Treaty. 
Moreover the existing European governance fail to link the different functional 
systems, even so, the sociological study in this paper demonstrates the importance. But 
surprisingly euro area politics do not appreciated this finding. How much more vulnerable and 
fragile the euro area will be as a result of a decade of path-dependent crisis management is 
unknown. But moral hazard is the key driving force of long-run trends and systemic failures, 
as the financial crisis and the flawed bank regulation has demonstrated in 2008 (Cochrane, 
2014). Hence, a new and effective rule-based system for the euro area institutions would be 
hard to design. Herzog and Hengstermann (2013) proposed a feasible alternative, based on a 
vote- and reputation function as well as automatic or independent rule enforcement 
mechanisms (Herzog, 2013). However, the main lessons are simple: A) rules and regulations 
have to imitate market forces. B) rules and regulations must be dynamic and never static – 
these are the main construction fault in Europe of today. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper provides an innovative and interdisciplinary insight to the root causes of 
the euro crisis. To develop and finally see the scientific breakthrough, one must leave the 
comfort zone and finally make sense of the things which are not within the common horizon 
of possibilities and scientific disciplines. Social systems theory is a sociological interpretation 
of the world, and it merely interprets the world without any influence. Therefore, it sheds light 
on cognitive and scientific limitations which are not studied in mainstream economics and 
political science. I demonstrate that this interdisciplinary approach enlightens our research 
object. 
The combination of both economic and sociological theory provides new insight: 
reforming the economic and monetary union needs a new paradigm with rather less political 
discretion and more automatic or independent enforcement mechanisms. Yes, this is slightly 
contrary to the democratic principle, but given the existing European governance it is the only 
feasible and – probably under the usual European culture of compromise – the only 
acceptable political solution in the near future. I still do think that the economic problems, in 
particular the current account imbalances and the flawed institutional setup, can be resolved 
and reformed in this direction. The design of a ‘new’ rule-based framework for the euro area 
                                                 
3 European commission’s review published on 28 November http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/ 
documents/com(2014)905_en.pdf). 
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helps to sustain the stability of the monetary union in the long-run and it would have benefits 
for countries and citizens alike. 
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